For the black box groups X encrypting PGL2(q), q odd, we propose an algorithm constructing a subgroup encrypting Sym 4 and subfield subgroups of X. We also present the analogous algorithms for black box groups encrypting (P)SL2(q).
Introduction
It becomes apparent that the groups PSL 2 (q) and PGL 2 (q), q odd, play a fundamental role in the constructive recognition of black box groups of Lie type of odd characteristic [6] . This paper provides the fundamentals for the algorithms presented in [6] , that is, we present polynomial time Las Vegas algorithms constructing black box subgroups encrypting Sym 4 and subfield subgroups of black box groups encrypting PGL 2 (q). We also describe the corresponding algorithms for the black box groups encrypting (P)SL 2 (q).
In this paper, we use description of PGL 2 (q) as the semidirect product PGL 2 (q) = PSL 2 (q) ⋊ δ where δ is a diagonal automorphism of PSL 2 (q) of order 2. We refer the reader to [10, Chapter XII] or [21, Chapter 3.6] for the subgroup structure of (P)SL 2 (q).
A black box group X is a black box (or an oracle, or a device, or an algorithm) operating with 0-1 strings of bounded length which encrypt (not necessarily in a unique way) elements of some finite group G. The functionality of the black box is specified by the following axioms: the black box BB1 produces strings encrypting random elements from G; BB2 computes a string encrypting the product of two group elements given by strings or a string encrypting the inverse of an element given by a string; and BB3 compares whether two strings encrypt the same element in G. * School of Mathematics, University of Manchester, UK; alexandre@borovik.net † Nesin Mathematics Village, Izmir, Turkey; sukru.yalcinkaya@gmail.com
In this setting we say that black box group X encrypts G. A typical example is provided by a group G generated in a big matrix group GL n (p k ) by several matrices g 1 , . . . , g l . The product replacement algorithm [9] produces a sample of (almost) independent elements from a distribution on G which is close to the uniform distribution (see the discussion and further development in [2, 3, 7, 11, 14, 16, 18, 17, 19] ). We can, of course, multiply, invert, compare matrices. Therefore the computer routines for these operations together with the sampling of the product replacement algorithm run on the tuple of generators (g 1 , . . . , g l ) can be viewed as a black box X encrypting the group G. The group G could be unknown-in which case we are interested in its isomorphism type-or it could be known, as it happens in a variety of other black box problems.
Unfortunately, an elementary task of determining the order of a string representing a group element involves either integer factorisation or discrete logarithm. Nevertheless black box problems for matrix groups have a feature which makes them more accessible:
BB4 We are given a global exponent of X, that is, a natural number E such that it is expected that x E = 1 for all elements x ∈ X while computation of x E is computationally feasible.
Usually, for a black box group X arising from a subgroup in the ambient group GL n (p k ), the exponent of GL n (p k ) can be taken for a global exponent of X.
In this paper, we assume that all our black box groups satisfy assumptions BB1-BB4.
A randomized algorithm is called Las Vegas if it always returns a positive answer or fails with some probability of error bounded by the user, see [1] for a discussion of randomized algorithms.
We refer reader to [5] for a more detailed discussion of black box groups and the nature of the problems in black box group theory.
Our principal result is the following. 
The running time of the algorithm is O(ξ(log log q + 1) + µ(k log log q log q + log q)), where µ is an upper bound on the time requirement for each group operation in X and ξ is an upper bound on the time requirement, per element, for the construction of random elements of X. 2 Subfield subgroups and
Note that G has two conjugacy classes of involutions, say ±-type involutions, where the order of the centralizer of a +-type involution is 2(q − 1) and the order of the centralizer of a −-type involution is 2(q + 1). Notice that C G (i) = T ⋊ w where T is a torus of order (q ± 1) and w is an involution inverting T . Throughout the paper, we consider the involutions of +-type if q ≡ 1 mod 4 and −-type if q ≡ −1 mod 4 so that the order of the torus T is always divisible by 4; we call them involutions of right type.
We set 5-tuple (i, j, x, s, T )
where i ∈ G is an involution of right type, T < G is the torus in C G (i), j ∈ G is an involution of right type which inverts T , x ∈ G is an element of order 3 normalising i, j and s ∈ T is an element of order 4. We also set k = ij and note that k is also of right type. Clearly V = i, j is a Klein 4-subgroup and i, j, x ∼ = Alt 4 . Moreover, we have i, j, x, s ∼ = Sym 4 . An alternative and slightly easier construction of Sym 4 in PGL 2 (q) is as follows. Let i, j ∈ G ∼ = PGL 2 (q) be involutions of right type where j inverts the torus in C G (i), choosing the elements t i , t j of order 4 in the tori in C G (i) and C G (j), respectively, we have Sym 4 ∼ = t j , t j . However, such a construction of Sym 4 in PGL 2 (q) does not cover the corresponding construction of Alt 4 in PSL 2 (q) when q ≡ ±3 mod 8, see Remark 2.1 (1). For the sake of completeness, we follow the setting in (1).
Remark 2.1. (2) If G ∼ = SL 2 (q), then i, j are pseudo-involutions (whose squares are the central involution in SL 2 (q)) and V = i, j is a quaternion group. Moreover, if q ≡ ±3 mod 8 (q ≡ ±1 mod 8, respectively), the subgroup i, j, x ( i, j, s, x , respectively) is N G (V ), where s is an element of order 8 in
The main ingredient of the algorithm in the construction of Sym 4 and subfield subgroups of G ∼ = PGL 2 (q) is to construct an element x ∈ G of order 3 permuting some mutually commuting involutions i, j, k ∈ G of right type. The following lemma provides explicit construction of such an element. Proof. Observe first that i n1 = j g and j n2 = s. Then, since s = k
), equivalently, k ∈ C G (j) and the claim follows. It is now clear that i x = k since ij = k. It is clear that x ∈ N G (V ) where V = i, j and x has order 3. Lemma 2.3. Let G, h 1 and h 2 be as in Lemma 2.2. Then the probability that h 1 and h 2 have odd orders is bounded from below by 1/2 − 1/2q.
Proof. We first note that the subgroup i, x ∼ = Alt 4 is a subgroup of L ≤ G where L ∼ = PSL 2 (p), so the involutions i, j, k belong to a subgroup isomorphic to PSL 2 (q). Therefore it is enough to compute the estimate in H ∼ = PSL 2 (q). Notice that all involutions in H are conjugate. Therefore the probability that h 1 and h 2 have odd orders is the same as the probability of the product of two random involutions from H to be of odd order.
We denote by a one of these numbers (q ± 1)/2 which is odd and by b the other one. Then |H| = q(q 2 − 1)/2 = 2abq and |C H (i)| = 2b for any involution i ∈ H. Hence the total number of involutions is
Now we shall compute the number of pairs of involutions (i, j) such that their product ij belongs to a torus of order a. Let T be a torus of order a. Then N H (T ) is a dihedral group of order 2a. Therefore the involutions in N H (T ) form the coset N H (T )\T since a is odd. Hence, for every torus of order a, we have a 2 pairs of involutions whose product belong to T . The number of tori of order a is |H|/|N H (T )| = 2abq/2a = bq. Hence, there are bqa 2 pairs of involutions whose product belong to a torus of order a. Thus the desired probability is
For the subfield subgroups isomorphic to PGL 2 (p a ) of G ∼ = PGL 2 (q), q = p k , p an odd prime, we extend our setting in (1) and set 6-tuple
where r ∈ T has order (p a ± 1) where (p a ± 1)/2 is even. Notice that if a is a divisor of k, then the torus T contains an element r of order (p a ± 1) where (p a ± 1)/2 is even. The following lemma provides explicit generators of the subfield subgroups of G.
Lemma 2.4. Let G ∼ = PGL 2 (q), q = p k for some k 2 and (i, j, x, s, r, T ) be as in (2) . Then r, x ∼ = PGL 2 (p a ) except when a = 1 and p = 5.
Observe that L is a subgroup of some H G where H ∼ = PGL 2 (p). Now assume first that a = 1. Since r ∈ C G (i), the order of the subgroup T ∩ H is p ± 1. Since T is cyclic, it has only one subgroup of order p ± 1 so r ∈ H. Thus r, x H. By the subgroup structure of PGL 2 (p), the subgroup L ∼ = Sym 4 is either a maximal subgroup or contained in a maximal subgroup of H isomorphic to Sym 4 ⋊ δ where δ is a diagonal automorphism of PSL 2 (q). Hence, if |r| 7, or equivalently p 7, then we have r, x = H since such a maximal subgroup does not contain elements of order bigger than 7. As we noted above, if p = 3, then L ∼ = Sym 4 ∼ = PGL 2 (3). Observe that if a > 1 and a is a divisor of k, then an element r of order p a ± 1, where (p a ± 1)/2 is even, belongs to a subgroup H ∼ = PGL 2 (p a ) hence the lemma follows from the same arguments above. 
The algorithm
In this section we present an algorithm for the black box group encrypting PGL 2 (p k ) and the corresponding algorithm for the groups (P)SL 2 (p k ) follows from Remarks 2.1 and 2.5.
In order to cover the algorithm in Corollary 1.3, we assume below that a divisor a of k is given as an input. Observe that such an input is not needed for the construction of a subfield subgroup PGL 2 (p).
Algorithm 3.1. Let X be a black box group isomorphic to PGL 2 (q), q = p k , p an odd prime.
Input:
• A set of generators of X.
• The characteristic p of the underlying field.
• An exponent E for X.
• A divisor a of k.
Output:
• A black box subgroup encrypting Sym 4 .
• A black box subgroup encrypting PGL 2 (p a ) except when a = 1 and p = 5.
Outline of Algorithm 3.1 (a more detailed description follows below):
1. Find the size of the field q = p k (This step is not needed for Corollary 1.3).
2. Construct an involution i ∈ X of right type from a random element together with a generator t of the torus T < C X (i) and a Klein 4-group V = i, j in X where j is an involution of right type.
3. Construct an element x of order 3 in N X (V ).
4. Set s = t |T |/4 and deduce that s, x ∼ = Sym 4 .
Set r = t
|T |/(p a ±1) where (p a ± 1)/2 is even and deduce that r, x ∼ = PGL 2 (p a ) except when a = 1 and p = 5.
Now we give a more detailed description of Algorithm 3.1.
Step 1: We compute the size q of the underlying field by Algorithm 5.5 in [22] .
Step 2: Let E = 2 k m where (2, m) = 1. Take an arbitrary element g ∈ X. If the order of g is even, then the last non-identity element in the following sequence is an involution
Let i ∈ X be an involution constructed as above. Then, we construct C X (i) by the method described in [4, 8] together with the result in [20] .
To check whether i is an involution of right type, we construct a random element g ∈ C X (i) and consider g q±1 . If |g| > 2 and g q+1 = 1, then i is of +-type. We follow the analogous process to check whether i is of −-type. We have C X (i) = T ⋊ w where T is a torus of order q ± 1 and w is an involution which inverts T . Observe that the coset T w consists of involutions inverting T , so half of the elements of C X (i) are the involutions inverting T and half of the involutions in T w are of the same type as i. We check whether j has the same type as i by following the same procedure above. Let j ∈ C X (i) be such an involution, then, clearly, V = i, j is a Klein 4-group. For the construction of a generator of T , notice that a random element of C X (i) is either an involution inverting T or an element of T and, by [15] , the probability of finding a generator of a cyclic group of order q ± 1 is at least O(1/ log log q). Since |T | is divisible by 4, we can find an element t ∈ C X (i) such that t 2 = 1 and t |T |/2 = 1 with probability at least O(1/ log log q) and such an element is a generator of T .
Step 3: By Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3, we can construct an element x of order 3 normalizing V = i, j with probability at least 1/2 − 1/2q.
Step 4: Since the order T is divisible by 4, we set s = t |T |/4 and we can deduce that s, x ∼ = Sym 4 from the discussion in the beginning of Section 2.
Step 5: It follows from Lemma 2.4 that the subgroup r, x encrypts a black box group PGL 2 (p a ) except when a = 1 and p = 5.
Following the arguments in Remarks 2.1 and 2.5, we have the corresponding algorithms for the black box groups encrypting (P)SL 2 (q).
Complexity
Let µ be an upper bound on the time requirement for each group operation in X and ξ an upper bound on the time requirement, per element, for the construction of random elements of X.
We outline the running time of Algorithm 3.1 for each step as presented in the previous section. For simplicity, we assume that E = |X| = |PGL 2 (q)| = q(q 2 − 1).
Step 1 First, random elements in X belong to a torus of order q−1 or q+1 with probability at least 1 − O(1/q). Then, in each type of tori, by [15] , we can find an elements of order q−1 and q+1 with probability c/ log log q for some constant c. Therefore, producing m = O(log log q) elements g 1 , . . . , g m , we assume that one of g i has order q −1 and g j has order q +1. Now, checking each g p(p 2ℓ −1) i = 1 involves at most log p 2ℓ+1 group operations making the overall cost to determine the exact power of p involving in
Hence the size of the field can be computed in time O(kµ log log q log q + ξ log log q).
Step 2 By [12, Corollary 5.3], random elements in X have even order with probability at least 1/4. Then, construction of an involution i from a random element and checking whether an element of the form ii g has odd order for a random element involves constant number of construction of a random element in X and C X (i) and log E ≤ log q 3 group operations by repeated square and multiply method. Checking whether an involution is of desired type involves log E group operations. By [15] , we can find a generator for the torus T ≤ C X (i) with probability O(1/ log log q) and checking whether it is indeed a generator of T involves log q group operations. Hence we can construct involutions i, j of desired type and a generator t of the torus T in time O(ξ(1 + log log q) + µ log log q log q).
Step 3 By Lemma 2.3 the elements h 1 = ij g and h 2 = jk involves log E group operations making overall cost O(ξ + µ log q) to construct an element x of order 3 permuting the involutions i, j, k of right type.
Step 4 The element s can be constructed in time O(µ log q).
Step 5 The element r can be constructed in time O(µ log q).
Combining the running times of the steps above, the overall running time of the algorithm for the construction of Sym 4 and PGL 2 (p k ) is O(ξ(log log q + 1) + µ(k log log q log q + log q)).
Observe that the algorithm presented in Section 3 together with Remarks 2.1 and 2.5 and the computation of the complexity above gives a proof of Theorem 1.1 and Corollaries 1.2 and 1.3.
